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TNCs And Commodities In SSA: Problems, Prospects and Potentials
Introduction
1. TNCs are usually seen as dominating commodity production in the South, 
processing (usually in the North) and international marketing. They are 
also frequently perceived as diabolic ex machinae who exploit (in the 
colloquial or monopsonist not just the technical sense) and less 
frequently as deii ex machinae who cause export, tax revenues, a 
burgeoning national bourgeoisie and development to flow.
2. These summaries are all over-simplifications. There are very major
differences from commodity to commodity and country to country as well as 
among production, pre-trade processing, further processing, pre-export 
auctions and subsequent trading. Equally the division of gains among 
producers, host states and TNCs varies widely as do TNC preferred 
ownership, profit source strategies - by product, geographic region and - 
apparently - TNC.
3. This paper includes a brief review of the production, processing,
marketing picture in SSA followed by a summary of actual and potential 
gains and costs. It will also note the prospects and potentials of TNC 
involvement (including different groups of TNCs notably development 
agencies like the Commonwealth Development Corporation and international 
trading firms not basically linked to productions nor based primarily on 
commodity trade). The concluding section will review the potential uses 
of TNCs to African commodity sectors and states together with certain 
associated risks.
The Present Picture
4. Basic commodity production varies in ownership among hydrocarbons, hard 
rock minerals (and diamonds) and soft agricultural/forest/sea 
commodities. In hydrocarbons the dominant forms involve partnerships (de
jure or via varied oil sharing formulas) between TNCs and state oil
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enterprises with a high share of surplus accruing to the state via taxes, 
enterprise profit oil shares and/or dividends. 100$ TNC subsidiary
production is decreasingly common while the high cost and risk of 
locating, proving and bringing on stream has deterred state enterprises 
from acting on their own as well as making the private domestic sector 
role negligible.
5. Hard rock minerals (and diamonds) are, by a plurality, a joint venture 
sector (state enterprise TNC) but with significant state enterprise and 
private (usually but not always TNC subsidiary) sub-sectors. An late 
1960s-1970s trend toward 100$ public enterprise ownership seems to have 
turned in favour of joint ventures. In any case it was neither universal 
nor quite what it seemed. Many state corporations had such elaborate, 
wide ranging and unaccountable (or at least not held to account) 
management and marketing contracts as to make them disguised joint 
ventures whether intentionally or not. In extreme cases it appeared the 
TNC got a high, assured profit with upside potential and the state all 
the risk, all the capital cost (purchase and investment) and a 
problematic return on its investment. Many state mining companies have 
suffered from investment starvation (especially for proving and 
developing new reserves to assure their medium term future) and from 
limited procurement and marketing management expertise.
6. Smallholder and domestic (public or mixed) plantation production is 
dominant for agricultural commodities. Further the somewhat atavistic or 
historical foreign private holding - except in tea - are usually held by 
smaller, specialist firms which are not TNCs as usually understood. The 
two major exceptions (in some, not all, countries) are sugar and 
pineapple where TNC (or TNC led de jure or de facto joint ventures) are 
common and, on the whole, expanding. Domestic marketing is usually (but 
by no means always, e.g. Nigeria nationally and sugar as a product) 
within a national public sector marketing enterprise framework with 
varying degrees of (usually domestic) private participation in buying 
from producers, internal transport and storage. Formerly a major source 
of state revenue (via Marketing Board surpluses and export taxes), 
agricultural commodity exports now are often apparently bottomless drains 
on public sector revenue (e.g. Cote d'Ivoire), near breakeven (e.g. 
Tanzania, Kenya) or minor revenue sources (e.g. Somalia). But in a few
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cases (notably Ghana and Uganda) absence of alternative taxable income 
flows has left them a key source of government revenue at the cost of 
leaving only 30 to 40$ of export value at official exchange rates to the 
actual producers. Forestry, like mining, is mixed albeit with a larger 
private domestic and a lower true TNC share. Marketing boards are 
relatively rare and state conservation and reafforestation policies are 
weak in most cases (but - e.g. Ghana - exceptions exist) while ability to 
hold producers accountable is even weaker. Fishing (for export markets) 
has not been a success area either for state corporations without TNC 
partners nor for pure TNC operations. Relatively successful cases are 
mostly state enterprise partnerships (whether formally jv's or not) with 
foreign state or TNC entities making managerial, equipment, storage and 
marketing - plus less often risk capital) inputs.
7. Differences by state strategy are currently less prominent than in the 
1970s and diminishing. TNC, smaller foreign firm or domestic private 
enterprise involvement is generally welcomed at least selectively. The 
number of states which do not seek some local enterprise partner role is 
also diminishing although there is still a divergence on attitudes to TNC 
subsidiary production, especially in agriculture. TNC strategy seems to 
be generally in favour of some form of de jure or de facto joint ventures 
in hydrocarbons, hard rock minerals and probably fishing, but a gradual 
withdrawal (or at least no expansion) in production level role 
agricultural commodities with no clear trend in forestry. But strategies 
and attitudes vary by TNC. For example, Anglo-de Beers views domestic 
joint venture partners (as well as independent trade unions) as a 
significant goal while RTZ seems to see domestic partners (especially 
with any real say in production management or marketing) as undesirable 
and usually avoidable evils (a view similar to that it takes of trade 
unions).
8. Processing needs to be divided into that necessary (for transport cost or 
preservation reasons) before export and further processing. This is not 
a clearcut distinction for all products. For example, gas can be 
pressurised and shipped as is or converted into chemical form (notably 
ammonia and urea) before export while smelting (as well as concentration 
of ores) before export is usually highly cost efficient except for quite 
small production volumes (notably in tin ore) and cases in which initial
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conversion is very energy intensive (e.g. bauxite and manganese ore). 
But for most it is - seed cotton is not exportable without ginning for 
transport cost reasons, tea leaves because they would spoil and sisal
leaves for a mix of both reasons. Conversion to cloth, blended teas or
sisal twine, however, is clearly an optional further stage.
9. TNCs when involved in production do carry out necessary processing. They 
sometimes also contract process smaller direct producer output. Rarely 
do they operate pure contract processing except as a by-product of
present or past own output operations.
10. Their forward integration into further processing (e.g. refined vs raw 
sugar, copper wire vs refined copper, petroleum products vs crude oil) in 
African states is limited, usually less than their involvement in
Northern processing, often primarily African market related and not 
usually perceived as a growth area. The reasons are probably not 
uniform. EEC or other quota forms 'e.g. for raw sugar) and cascade 
tariffs may have historically conditioned patterns some TNCs would not 
defend strongly; but neither do they show much interest in seeking 
removal of such processing location distorting trade barriers. This may 
be allied, to the lack of any sustained attempt by African states to 
interest TNCs in processing for export joint ventures. In most countries 
attitudes are positive but little strategic thinking or priority 
attention to policy implementation has been evident.
11. In a handful of cases further processing for African and other South 
primary exports has been located in other African states - notably the 
Edea (Cameroon) and Tema (Ghana) aluminium smelters. But these two cases 
both seem to turn on favourable power contracts and to be marked by 
severe reluctance to integrate vertically either backward (bauxite, 
alumina) or forward (aluminium sheets, circles or finished products for 
export even though these would appear to be economically viable in both 
countries. The petroleum refineries in non-oil producing states are not 
analogous both because few use African crude to any significant extent 
and because they are domestic market focussed. The notable reluctance 
of TNCs to build export oriented refineries appears to relate primarily 
to their own downstream capacity in the North and to the sogginess of 
refined products markets outside integrated flows within enterprise
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groups which has made such investment relatively financially unattractive 
at least since 1973.
12. TNC commodity based manufacturing does exist in Africa. In some 
industries - notably textiles in a few countries and free trade zone 
production in Mauritius - it does involve non-trivial extra African 
exports. In a slightly larger number of cases intra-African exports are 
relatively substantial relative to output. But these cases seem to bear 
little relationship to TNC global commodity strategy (or even to domestic 
basic commodity input availability). They are rather primarily an aspect 
of exporting manufacturing capacity to safety inside national or 
sub-regional tariff barriers when the alternative would be substantial 
export market losses. The Mauritius free trade zone is virtually unique 
because so is Mauritius supply of abundant, low unit labour cost, 
semi-skilled workers. It is clearly an aspect of "export platform" not 
commodity strategy.
13. State and domestic private further production/manufacturing is dominantly 
domestic or - less commonly - sub-regional market focussed. Some 
exceptions (e.g. plywood and veneer, cacoa intermediate products) exist 
but most have been hampered by limited international marketing expertise 
and - apparently - high unit production costs.
14. International marketing of African commodities - as of all commodity 
trade and, indeed, international trade more generally is TNC dominated. 
The proportion of African commodity exports sold directly to final 
processor or manufactures with no TNC intermediation is quite low 
(probably under 10?). However, there are significant differences in form 
(and, less clearly, degree) of TNC control and some exceptions to the 
general rule.
15. Direct transfers by TNC subsidiaries, affiliates or managed units to 
other TNC group enterprises are common in hydrocarbons, metals, a handful 
of agricultural products and fishing. In hydrocarbons direct monitoring 
of prices is both feasible and common elsewhere it is, in practice less 
so. Cases in which intra TNC group transfer prices appear to yield 
significantly less than the going transfer prices among independent 
groups include Zaire metals, Kenyan pineapple and - in the past -
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Liberian rubber. But more generally international trade in most 
commodities is dominated by a small number of broking, factoring and 
trading houses none of which is African and most of which are TNC group 
(processing/manufacturing, general trading or commodity trading bases) 
members.
16. Domestic auctions are fairly common among larger SSA producers. The 
problem is averting bidder rings. In many cases domestic auction prices 
are well below Northern terminal market ones less insurance, freight and 
finance strongly suggesting rings. One means sometimes - e.g. Tanzania 
coffee - in reducing collusion and raising prices is for a large (in 
practice public sector) firm to arrange tentative direct sale to Northern 
manufacturers and to bid up the price to the level at which these 
generate positive but modest profits.
17. Direct participation on Northern commodity markets (and especially in 
futures markets) has a less than happy overall record. African sellers 
have tended not to be very expert market participants and both futures 
contract operations and direct sales have tended to involve high data 
collection and representation expense but to generate average proceeds 
lower than the average spot price on Northern terminal markets, e.g. 
notoriously the Tanzanian sisal and the Nigerian cocoa marketing bodies. 
There are exceptions - Tanzania's coffee and cotton boards in most years 
as well as Ghana's cocoa marketing body. Similarly the Zambian and 
Zimbabwean metal marketing companies which must make or authorise all 
metal export sales (as owner or agent have had some success in halting or 
curtailing intra TNC group low price transfers and, to a lesser extent, 
getting prices above the average on terminal markets.
18. The reasons for low SSA entry relate primarily to and personnel barriers 
to entry. The capital requirements being largely working capital backed 
by assets on the high seas or held in stock in the North are by no means 
negligible but are probably less severe for public (albeit not domestic 
private) than the knowledge/personnel barriers which have proven costly 
and time consuming to erode.
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Gains and Costs Revisited
19. TNCs do provide capital, managerial and technical competence and export
buyers. That - in general - is not at issue. However, sometimes new
market development, e.g. for pyrethrum when export marketing and
pre-export processing was dominated by a single TNC, the chance to use 
environmentalism to build new uses for a short half life insecticide
harmless to warm-blooded animals was totally ignored and wasted. The 
same has tended to be true of developing South markets since these 
traditionally have been small and rapid sustained expansion requires 
purchasing (for use or resale) of comparable values of exports from the 
South importer. Further, some TNC led design and construction management 
has been strikingly technically and cost inefficient (e.g. sugar in the 
Sudan) as has some operating management (e.g. sisal in East Africa and 
horticulture in West.
20. The division of gains has varied widely apparently depending both on TNC 
strategy and on African ability to conceptualise goals and to bargain for 
them effectively. But, especially in marketing and in hydrocarbons, and 
including the profit element in management contracts and intra firm 
export and input transfer pricing, TNCs have probably done reasonably 
well on gaining significant net returns on capital employed albeit this 
judgement may not apply to - e.g. sugar, rubber and sisal among soft 
products nor since 1975 to hard rock minerals in general. However, the 
low profits or losses in these cases relate to negative surpluses at 
production level not to high surpluses to host governments. TNC traders 
have continued to make high returns relative to own assets employed as 
have hydrocarbon producers and TNCs serving as de facto managing partners 
via contractual agreements.
21. The real issues, however, probably relate more to gains made in Africa or 
accessible to sharing by Africans than to TNC/Africa gains now located 
and recorded in ways allowing sharing. TNC's have by and large tended to 
locate processing off continent reducing not just surplus but value added 
in and exports from SSA. Because processed product markets are less 
transparent than primary and because African exporters have less 
experience in these markets, the need for TNC services (whether as 
brokers/traders or as manufacturers concluding term contracts with
technical and quality control advice) in marketing is very substantial. 
This is especially true now that many manufacturing TNCs (a notable 
example is chocolate in the USA) think profit (or at any rate return on 
assets) optimisation over time implies disengagement from intermediate 
processing if assured independent supplies of adequate quality exist. 
Similarly cost effective entry into terminal futures markets and/or 
direct sale to manufacturers can be facilitated and learning losses 
reduced if carried out as a joint venture with an established trading 
house (TNC or other) with a relevant global information network. Per 
contra in mining and hydrocarbons the key use of a TNC is to mobilise 
external finance and, frequently, to do so in ways limiting country 
exposure in the event of failure.
22. Not all of these potential gains require substantial use of TNC equity. 
Many can be done via contractual arrangements or joint ventures with 
relatively small TNC risk capital stakes. The major exception is 
hydrocarbons for which high risk pre-proving expenses exceed development 
investment and cannot be born by poor countries without a substantial 
production base and enough potential production structures to spread 
risk. Even so significant TNC equity has uses in creating a stable 
relationship and in building external credibility (both to buyers and 
financiers). It is very expensive money (25% a year post tax cumulated 
from investment dates is probably the going rate, however this is split 
among dividends, contractual profits, transfer pricing and other gains) 
in the event of success but may (depending on contractual and transfer 
price gains) be relatively low cost until significant surpluses accrue or 
in the event of failure.
Attracting TNC Investment
23. If careful analysis of options suggests TNC capital (especially in 
marketing, processing, hard rock mining or hydrocarbons) is desirable, 
considerable problems surround mobilising it. TNCs want high rates of 
return (averaging out experience over a range of new investments), low 
political risk, remittability of profits, stability of arrangements and 
minimisation of profit risk. SSA states are doubtless able to prevent 
these conditions existing, only on political risk minimisation, reduction
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of profit risk and stability enhancement is it evident that they can have 
much positive impact. However, in marginal cases those are not 
unimportant areas.
24. Tax structures and investment codes do not determine where TNCs invest. 
Sky high taxes and the absence of investment codes with clear payment 
after takeover (if any) and independent arbitral provisions do, however, 
help determine where they do not. Therefore, general tax and investment 
code legislation (and advice on them from experienced, independent export 
teams - e.g. those of the Commonwealth Secretariat's Technical Assistance 
Group) are worth having. But in the case of most substantial
investments they create parameters within which negotiation on special 
conditions is easier not complete read-off answers.
25. Profit risk reduction turns on relationships likely to prove not conflict 
free but in which conflicts can be resolved without undue disruption of 
business during the resolution process and in which built-in conflicts of 
interest are minimised. By and large broad data provision accountability 
(including independent auditing acceptable to the host) helps achieve 
this - much as most TNCs still doubt it. A sensible SSA state should be 
more alarmed when a potential investor on data submitted has no realistic 
hope of high returns than when his profit or supply goals are clear and 
so are the ways he can realistically anticipate achieving them.
26. Stability of arrangements requires, inter alia, that future gains 
divisions will appear equitable to the host in cases of high and the TNC 
in cases of mediocre profits. Given unavoidable profit uncertainties at 
the time of investment this is a hard goal to achieve but failure to do 
so has made traditional concession and fixed rate regimes for TNC 
subsidiaries inherently unstable. Two main ways forward exist: a.) joint 
ventures which share unexpected gains and mediocre results but also may 
entail substantial host country enterprise risk investment in scarce 
foreign exchange and, b. ) additional profits tax (or royalties where a 
host enterprise supplies raw materials to a TNC or JV processing one) 
which provide that when average post tax cumulative profit on equity from 
date of investment exceeds a given rate (usually 20 to 25$) then 
additional profits will, in addition to standard company tax, be subject 
to special taxes (e.g. one half of post tax profits in excess of the
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negotiated base level). To date such agreements pioneered by Papua New 
Guinea and TAG in the early 1970s and in diamonds and hydrocarbons in the 
second half of the decade do appear to increase stability, host country 
receipts if profits are high and - probably - TNC willingness to invest.
What Is To Be Done?
27. TNC involvement is not from an SSA point of view an end in itself but a 
potential means to export, producer net income, fiscal returns and/or 
sectoral diversification gains. Within TNC involvement equity investment 
is one mode for structuring relationships. Both means and modes should 
be analysed as to likely gains and costs both absolutely and relative to 
other means and modes. The results of such analysis will vary from stage 
to stage (production, necessary processing, further processing, 
international marketing); among commodity groups (hydrocarbons, hard rock 
minerals and diamonds, agricultural and forestry fishing) and 
commodities; from country to country and over time. For example a TNC 
subsidiary rubber plantation is likely to involve high costs and low 
gains to both host and TNC (which is the reason this is a shrinking 
means/mode). A technical partner in processing and international 
marketing arrangement might be much more attractive to both sides. At 
the opposite extreme a large natural gas to ammonia/urea operation needs 
external (TNC or mini TNC) partners in marketing, production, technology 
and equity or it is unlikely ever to get off the ground still less to 
operate at capacity or yield acceptable rates of return. Because such a 
plant is perceived by external lenders as requiring hands-on TNC 
involvement to be a prudent risk their having a not absolutely 
insignificant (though not necessarily a majority) equity stake as well as 
long term operation/marketing contracts is sine quo non for raising 
external loan finance - especially on a non-recourse basis (i.e. covered 
by the project only not a government guarantee).
28. Analysis, negotiation, innovation are key words in making the most of 
good (and keeping out of poor) potential opportunities. For example, APT 
is a way to increase stability, development bodies like CDC are 
alternatives to traditional TNC'S in processing and general trading 
companies to commodity focussed TNC groups or units in respect to
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international marketing. Especially if equity rates of return are 
unlikely to be high but specific quantifiable export, fiscal and other 
enterprise gains to the host country are likely to be large, contractual 
arrangements (tied to output, gross export revenue and/or surplus 
generation not to a cost plus of fixed fee formula) may be cheaper to the 
SSA host and more attractive (by limiting the investment base needed to 
generate surpluses) to the TNC than standard subsidiary or equity 
arrangements. This may be of particular relevance in marketing processed 
products to several large manufacturers or wholesalers who wish - if 
anything - to disengage from investment in processing but do wish to 
maximise reliability and quality suitability of supply sources.
29. Specific potentially useful roles (like present patterns and their 
consonance with SSA interests) cannot, as noted, be generalised. 
However, certain guidelines or check points for screening may be useful:
a. Production is likely to need TNC investment only in hydrocarbons and 
hard rock minerals. Except for these cases most technology is either 
available "off the shelf" or not available from TNCs. Especially in 
SSA, TNC plantations are rarely good business for hosts and are often 
bad business for all parties. There may be room for specific startup 
and early year technical support on other new commodities but 
contractual arrangements - including with production oriented 
development financiers like CDC - should be explored as alternative 
to ones with standard TNCs or smaller foreign enterprises;
b. In processing most technology is available "off the shelf" and - 
again except for hydrocarbons and minerals - neither investment scale 
nor operating complexity normally require major long term TNC equity 
involvement nor even long term (versus initial period) management or 
technical contracts. But these commodities pose special marketing 
problems often needing TNC or other experienced seller contractual or 
marketing subsidiary joint venture arrangements. The alternatives of 
development financiers with experience, existing South enterprises 
(e.g. India in leather) and manufactures seeking to reduce 
commitments to in-house intermediate processing as contractual 
partners should be canvassed. A key factor - whatever TNC role seems 
appropriate - is getting cascade tariffs and quotas reduced or
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eliminated. Partners should be chosen with a view to their capacity 
to further that result and their freedom from vested interests in 
obstructing or delaying it;
c. in international marketing gaining broader access at acceptable unit 
cost levels and learning period expenses may well often indicate a 
quest for a suitable TNC joint venture as well as contractual 
partner. General trading companies with no vested interests in 
production or particular commodities and/or manufactures seeking new 
sources of supply (especially of intermediates) may often be better 
partners than old line commodity TNCs (or smaller foreign commodity 
group analogues). South-South trade, a significant potential growth 
area, may be a partial exception. To be large and sustainable such 
gains often need to be in the context of multi-product two-way trade 
expansion (not a commodity marketing TNCs forte). General trading 
firms (including South based ones) on technical/managerial 
contractual terms may still have value especially for smaller SSA 
economies with limited public or private sector trading expertise.
30. In surplus division the name of the game is not minimising TNC profits - 
unless of course their rapid, unnegotiated withdrawal is the objective. 
Rather it is to ensure that TNC gains are known and acceptable and that 
agreements on sharing "windfall" profits are set up in advance. The key 
requirements are accountability for disclosure on TNC quests or partners 
to hosts together with African capacity to analyse such data and to build 
up independent data sources (an area in which South-South exchange of 
information could be very valuable) together with profit sharing formulae 
(in joint ventures and in respect to long term contracts) and variants of 
APT.
31. TNCs do not and need not dominate African commodities. Room for 
manoeuvre exists and should be developed. Neither are they deii or 
diaboli ex machinae but instruments whose selective use, when cost 
effective should be part of all SSA states' commodity strategy and policy 
conceptualisation, articulation and implementation.
- R. H. Green 
Maputo/Falmer 
27-VI-89
COMMODITY PRODUCTION AND TRADE: 
The Impact of Domestic Policies
OVERVIEW
1. Commodity production levels are determined by a complex set of factors, 
often in interaction. These may be grouped as the "Six Ins" (Paul Streeten's 
term): Incentives, Inputs, Innovation, Information, Infrastructure and 
Institutions. Prices enter mainly as incentives but are not the whole of it. 
The weight of professional opinion is that prices alone, without combination 
with the other factors, are not the most powerful factor, although they remain 
an essential part of a full policy based on the "Six Ins".
2. For each individual producer, his or her level of production will be 
determined primarily:
a. by the price that he or she expects to receive relative to the cost of 
production;
b. by the price of that particular commodity relative to the price of
alternative goods or services that the producer could either sell or
consume.
But note that "cost of production" in this context assumes the availability of 
inputs and of credit and access to land securely held or paid for at a 
reasonable rent; and "price received" assumes reasonably prompt payment and 
the availability of desired consumer goods for purchase.
3. Domestic policies have had - and continue to have - a major impact on
cost/price ratios and the price receivable for any one commodity relative to
other goods and services. But evaluation of the impact of domestic policies 
has often suffered from lack of clarity because:
a. appropriate goals have not been specified (e.g. these should not be 
maximisation of quantity produced or even of gross export earnings but
maximisation of revenues over costs with due regard - especially in
agriculture - to optimising the income earning opportunities of the 
poorest producers);
b. distortions have occurred in the use of public institutions and policy
instruments (e.g. marketing boards that were founded to even out
producer prices have been used to raise revenue for governments; low 
prices set by the state for domestically produced and consumed 
foodstuffs have turned the internal terms of trade against agricultural 
producers; a foreign exchange rate which overvalues the domestic 
currency penalises primary commodity exporters while creating 
rent-winning opportunities for political favourites and bureaucrats);
c. an artificial dichotomy has often been posed between outward (export 
promoting) and inward (import substitution promoting) policies, when in 
practice the best policy must combine the selective promotion of those 
exports for which the country has (or can acquire) a comparative 
advantage with the promotion of selective, efficient import 
substitution.
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4. Generalisations about long term movements in the terms of trade between 
primary commodities and manufactured goods have to be made with care, 
especially if there is a danger that the beginning of a period might represent 
a peak and the end of it a trough or vice versa. Nevertheless both analytical 
reasoning and the statistical evidence would appear to support the 
generalisation that revenues from the production of primary commodities have 
since the end of the Second World War fared poorly relative to revenues 
derived from the production of manufactures, apparently because:
a. global demand for commodities has grown less rapidly than either global 
trade or global GDP (the income elasticity effect);
b. unit prices of commodities have risen less than those of manufactures.
Nor does it appear, in most cases, that relative productivity gains in 
commodity production (where these have occurred) have adequately compensated 
primary commodity producers against the adverse impact of these trends.
5. There have been exceptions to these trends in some years and for some 
commodities over fairly extended periods. However, among major commodities 
only diamonds - the one commodity for which there has been an institutional 
structure which effectively coordinates production with sales - seems to have 
moved consistently against these trends. Individual producers have certainly 
been able to benefit by shifting from one commodity to another (e.g. from 
rubber to cocoa to palm oil and now - perhaps - back to rubber); but the above 
analysis suggests that globally - and for relatively large economies - the 
room for adapting the commodity mix in production in order to offset slow 
growth in export earnings (valued in terms of imports) is relatively narrow.
6. Among major commodities, grains and sugar have performed particularly 
badly - notably over the past decade and a half. Whatever the merits of 
reducing dependence on imports of staple foods, this implies that the use of 
domestic policy to promote exports of these crops does not promise much. That 
conclusion might not hold for a very low cost grain or sugar producer which 
had previously been an importer or negligible exporter, and might not hold if 
export subsidies (notably by EEC and the USA) were phased out, but for most 
countries today it is a valid generalisation.
7. The general quantity growth and price trends for commodities raises the 
question as to whether domestic policies should be used to improve the 
domestic prices of such commodities relative either to import substitutes or 
to other exports. To do so is to run the danger of distorting the message of 
global price signals. As the core of an export development strategy, the use 
of domestic policies to manage - indeed, to reverse - trend global market 
price signals may be to plan to specialise in losers. This argument should 
not however be used to prevent the correction of those price distortions which 
occur when an overvalued exchange rate artificially reduces the domestic 
currency receipts of home exporters and the domestic currency price payable by 
home importers. Nor does it justify the reduction of local production for 
domestic consumption by the setting of prices at below market-clearing levels.
8. The occasions when state intervention would appear to be justified in 
raising the domestic price of a commodity above the equivalent border price 
would appear to be these:
a. when there is a strong domestic price bias against the commodity in 
question by comparison with international price ratios;
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b. when, as a result of declining export prices, domestic production is 
reduced leading to foreign exchange losses which cannot in the short 
term be made good by efficient export promotion or efficient import 
substitution (however such subsidisation of exports should be used with 
care and probably only for the short term);
c. if a particular commodity does face relatively favourable global market
demand and price trends, so that investment at higher levels than are 
likely to be forthcoming without intervention will occur (but again the 
government must have very convincing reasons for believing it can read 
future price trends better than the market).
These cases are not trivial. But they relate to general price reform (not the 
reform of commodity export pricing only) in the first case; to the rescue or 
rehabilitation of deteriorated existing commodity production sectors in the 
second; and to specific export opportunities in the third. They do not create 
a case for a general shielding of export commodity production from global 
price relativities.
9. Notwithstanding the unfavourable global trends and the harmful effects of 
international market conditions created by the actions of some OECD 
governments, notwithstanding even the ’fallacy of composition' argument, it is 
clear that commodity production and export will remain of great importance to
many African countries. Some will continue to depend upon mineral exports as
their primary source of foreign exchange. Export agriculture will continue to 
be a major source of income, employment, exports and government revenue. For 
SSA as a whole, export agriculture is equivalent to 7% of GDP; for Kenya, 17%; 
for Malawi, 18%; for Cote d'Ivoire, 3^ /6. Some recovery of market share will 
be possible for some African producers, even if it is recognised that it may 
not be advantageous for all African exporters simultaneously to try to do so 
in the face of competition from outside Africa determined to protect its 
market share. But the basically pessimistic view of this paper about global 
trends for primary commodities (reinforced by the additional note on 'new 
materials') suggests that policy initiatives (apart from correcting past 
mistakes and current distortions) should aim at six main objectives:
a. the development of new uses and new markets for established commodities;
b. measures (which may need to include internally established export 
revenue stabilisation funds) that will mitigate the harmful effects of 
commodity price fluctuations;
c. diversification of the commodity export mix, so that African countries 
become less dependent upon the price and upon the continuing demand for 
individual primary commodities;
d. further processing of commodities within their country of origin and 
sub-regionally - as the internal economic structure of such countries 
matures and internal linkages develop, it should be possible for GDP to 
expand faster than export earnings;
e. promotion of faster growth in the trade in primary commodities within 
the general context of South-South trade.
f. identification and introduction of policies that will enhance the 
comparative advantage of small producers in certain types of primary 
production so that the poor may benefit directly and structural 
adjustment be accompanied by structural transformation.
_n-
Domestic Instruments for Influencing Production
10. As a first principle it can be argued that, unless a special case can be 
made out, taxation should be approximately neutral as to source of income. 
Three caveats arise:
a. if certain commodities face falling real global price trends a modestly 
higher rate of taxation could be justified to reinforce market signals 
to alter the mix of production;
b. if commodity incomes are more unstable than incomes derived from other 
sources (and trend levels are predictable) then counter-cyclical 
taxation levels could be appropriate to avoid over-reaction to short 
term fluctuations. (But this implies that surpluses accumulated when 
prices are high will indeed be available for re-distribution to 
producers when prices are low.);
c. if the price of a commodity significant to an economy's overall exports 
is so low that export earnings (and therefore the country's import 
capacity) are threatened, then lower than average taxation (or even 
negative taxation, i.e. subsidies) may be justified for a transitional 
period to hold up export levels while more efficient exports (and/or 
import substitutes) are built up.
11. In practice many African governments have taxed income from commodity 
exports more heavily than income from other sources whether by export taxes or 
by running up statutory marketing surpluses. There was - especially in SSA - 
a tendency for the disparity to become larger in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Without doubt in several cases such taxation played a major role in bringing 
about stagnation or decline in output and exports, as well as encouraging 
smuggling.
12. A second policy instrument is devaluation. To the extent it is effective 
in real (not just nominal) terms, devaluation increases the relative price of 
those products which are tradeable relative to those which are not. In 
principle therefore it is less selective than commodity specific tax 
reductions (or subsidy increases) and should be neutral between commodities 
and other exports and among commodities. However, that neutrality assumes 
equal import-content. Because the import content in their production is 
generally low, agriculture commodities are likely to be favoured vis a vis 
other exports, and some commodities (e.g. tree crops) and some sub-modes of 
production (e.g. peasant) will be helped more than others.
13. Severely overvalued exchange rates (unless fully offset by export 
incentives, which is rare) clearly deter the growth of exports or even the 
maintenance of existing export levels. This results both from shifts in 
revenue/cost ratios and in prices relative to de facto non-tradeables (e.g. 
staple food in SSA in the 1970s and early 1980s). If a government does want 
to deter (or encourage) specific (commodity or other) exports, the use of 
targetted taxation (or subsidies) is much more efficient.
14. An undervalued exchange rate as an instrument to promote export is 
probably also inappropriate for most African countries although there is some 
evidence that Japan and S. Korea had 'undervalued' exchange rates for extended 
periods, to their advantage. Developing country real exchange rates generally 
have declined since 1970, although for SSA this decline may not have started 
until the early 1980s. For commodity producers it has been argued that this
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was a prudent response to adverse terms of trade shifts. However, given low 
commodity price elasticities the argument - globally and for major exporters -
is circular. If steady real exchange rate depreciation does increase the rate
of growth of commodity exports, it may also reinforce the terms of trade 
decline it was intended to offset.
15. Deliberate reduction of domestic marketing cost is also a policy
instrument. In some African countries marketing costs absorbed the largest
share of export proceeds, taxation took the next largest share and growers 
received the smallest share. Not surprisingly such patterns led to rapid 
declines in output, and to smuggling. Marketing surpluses (public or private) 
amounting to more than a normal return on capital employed are treated in this 
paper as a form of de facto taxation.
16. In most of SSA, marketing costs (especially, but not exclusively, in 
single channel public sector systems) are clearly too high. The reasons vary 
- too many employees, too high transport costs (relative to efficient fleet 
operators or hirers), too high physical losses, too long delay in sales and 
collection of proceeds (increasing finance and storage costs), poor 
management, corruption. Which cost elements are too high and how they can be 
reduced are questions of fact varying widely from case to case. The 
desirability of acting to reduce inefficient resource use however is clearcut. 
The case for passing on the full gains to growers (especially if the marketing 
operation was previously subsidised) is less universal. If prevailing 
revenue/cost and relative domestic price ratios are high enough to result in 
an adequate growth of output of a commodity facing inelastic demand, then 
subsidy reductions and/or allocations to build up alternative exports may have 
a higher opportunity value.
17. Policies that promote a steady decrease in production costs (other than 
by subsidy) are desirable however, whether or not world relative prices are 
deteriorating. Research and development expenditures on many (not all) 
tropical agricultural commodities are consistently too low, and the example of 
the international crop research institutes in spreading overhead costs and in 
improving the access of smaller producers to cost-reducing knowledge could be 
followed more widely. The same holds for demand-increasing research and 
development, which either alters commodity characteristics to fit existing 
product needs (as has been done for natural rubber) or creates new uses (the 
most famous example being instant coffee).
18. Other instruments that should be considered fall under the heading of 
administrative reform. These may include:
a. better land tenure, including redistribution, titling and reform of 
state farms;
b. better input supply regulation, including abolition of subsidies which 
favour capital intensive agriculture;
c. research and extension better suited to the needs of small farmers;
d. improved infrastructure, especially roads;
e. more support for parastatal reform and encouragement for efficient 
private sector marketing;.
f. identification of potential rehabilitation projects (e.g. in mining) 
where new joint venture arrangements can be combined with debt reduction 
measures;
g. debt for environmental protection schemes where the environmental 
protection aspects of a project will be supported by a foreign aid 
donor.
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International Marketing and Pre-Export Processing
19. Additional net export revenues from international marketing and 
pre-exporting processing are potentially superior in quality to those that may 
be gained from increased production. Because they do not increase the volume 
of the commodity produced, they therefore do not have a negative effect on 
global prices. That said, significant barriers exist to the cost-efficient 
achievement of these methods of augmenting export revenues - especially in 
respect of international marketing.
20. Auctioning before export and direct use of international commodity 
exchanges as well as direct sales to major users are international marketing 
activities within the competence of the public sectors of most African 
countries. They are also within the competence of the private sectors of a 
number. Deeper entry into commodity trading requires global information 
networks, experienced personnel and a large number of established business 
contacts as well as substantial working capital. Larger, middle income 
commodity exporters (e.g. several in Latin America and South and Southeast 
Asia) have the capacity to enter or expand in this field. Underwriting the 
learning costs would encourage participation, but it is an area where large 
sums of money can be lost by inexperienced operators.
21. Enhanced South-South commodity trade is practicable if some means of 
ensuring balanced bilateral or small group trade expansion (or expansion with 
agreed limits to imbalances) can be designed, negotiated and operated. More 
attention deserves to be paid to potential in this direction. Given the lack 
of well-developed TNC channels, domestic enterprises should be able to capture 
most of the ensuing marketing business.
22. Pre-export processing adds to export value without depressing commodity 
prices. For some primary products it does offer efficient ways to expand 
domestic value added and export earnings. Examples include timber, sugar, 
cocoa, oil seed, iron ore, sisal, hides and perhaps coffee and tea. What 
products are promising and how far processing should go (e.g. cocoa butter, 
powder, paste, liquor and mass - the intermediates - are likely to be more 
suitable than finished chocolate products) are empirical questions the answers 
to which vary by commodity, by country and over time.
23. Which other domestic policy instruments are needed (e.g. research and 
design funding, direct capital injection, capital mobilisation, initial period 
taxes below average) will vary. In general too little attention is devoted to 
potential in this area at the applied level, especially in SSA.
2 k . Domestic policy should include strong efforts to reduce international (= 
foreign domestic) barriers, notably:
a. cascade tariffs (could GATT be used for this?);
b. arrangements such as EEC's Lome Sugar Protocol which specifies a less
processed rather than an economically more efficient, more processed
form (i.e. raw vs refined in this case). (Could this be attended to in 
the Lome IV negotiations?);
These may be more achievable targets now than a decade ago. Many TNCs are
willing to contract out their initial processing operations and to use 
intermediates; some OECD processing sectors are not particularly economically 
significant nor self-evidently politically potent.
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Liberalisation and Commodity Production and Prices
25. Economic stringency - especially import compression and high net external 
payments for capital - creates pressure to maximise short term export 
earnings. For an economy more than, say, 25$ of whose exports are comprised 
of primary products, this is likely to mean pressure to raise the volume of 
commodity exports.
26. There are, however, countervailing forces. Export taxation may be a 
crucial revenue source, the capacity to subsidise exports may be limited, 
massive devaluation may be unable to alter domestic price relativities 
substantially, and investment capital to expand productive capacity may be 
scarce, to commodity producers in particular. Falling real global commodity 
prices, other things being equal, tend to reduce (or reverse) the rate of 
growth. Under the pressure of debt, adjustment and foreign exchange 
scarcities, many individual countries have tried to increase their own share 
of the market by expanding exports even in the face of falling prices, 
resulting in beggar-my-neighbour policies and overall immiseration.
27. 'Liberalisation' - especially when it is not in the context of an 
international package providing substantial debt service relief and new 
capital inflows - reinforces the tendencies of economic stringency to lead to 
efforts to boost short run exports. Further, by including devaluation in 
excess of what relative overall domestic price movements would justify it may 
offset (distort) the global market price signals deterring increase in output 
growth.
28. The evidence on this last point is mixed. Outside SSA, liberalisation 
seems to have led to export drives focussed on manufactures or pre-export 
processing more than on expanding commodity exports. In SSA, dramatic export 
growth has been limited to a few countries and has to a large extent 
represented rehabilitation of existing capacity and/or the clawing back of 
previously smuggled exports. The extent to which raising real producer prices 
has played a role is unequal - very high in some cases and problematic in 
others. The role of increased resource transfers (leading to increased import 
capacity utilised in part to meet the import requirements of commodity 
production and of the infrastructure serving it) is generally significant; 
significantly positive where such transfers did increase and significantly 
negative where they decreased.
29. Trade liberalisation in the sense of freeing both domestic exports and 
foreign imports from quantitative restrictions, licensing and other 
regulations tends to favour the producers of primary commodities, with certain 
reservations. The liberalisation needs to be accompanied by a realistic 
exchange rate. If there is pent up demand for foreign exchange, measures may 
be needed to ensure that priority access is accorded to those who require 
inputs for domestic production. If some domestic industries are badly run 
down but capable of rehabilitation, interim protection from competing imports 
may be required. Indeed the sequencing of liberalisation measures may be 
extremely important, preferably in the context of a regime of restrictions and 
licensing progressively being replaced by a suitable structure of tariffs, 
possibly supplemented by some export taxes where this is an appropriate way of 
taxing the natural 'rent' advantages of some commodity exports.
30. In SSA, liberalisation has tended to be built on the presumption that 
commodity exports were the key to restoring external balance and that 
commodities were likely to enjoy moderately rapidly growing markets and
constant or improving terms of trade. All three assumptions can now be seen 
to be wrong for most commodities and most countries. Thus time has been lost 
and attention directed away from articulating country-specific, practicable 
and efficient export development and import substitution strategies, and from 
the task of implementing such strategies.
Summary
31. Domestic policies - especially taxation, management of the exchange rate 
and promotion of cost reductions in production and domestic marketing - can 
effect commodity production significantly. Given current elasticities of 
demand and present global price projections what the optimal extent and 
pattern of incentives to increase the production of commodities ought to be is 
itself unclear - but certainly it must vary by commodity and by country. 
However, policies which erode existing commodity export bases while putting 
nothing in their place are clearly unsound.
32. Greater pre-export processing, South-South trade and participation in 
international marketing can be furthered by domestic policy. For some 
products and countries they hold out prospects of significant increases in net 
export earnings without the depressive price effects of export expansion to 
OECD and CMEA markets.
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Additional Note 1:
SUMMARY OF WORLD BANK’S REPRESENTATIVE 'POLICY PACKAGE1 
FOR THE REVIVAL OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY PRODUCTION IN SSA
1. Free producer prices from state regulation allowing them to be determined 
by market forces.
Fix monopolised prices at long term world market levels.
Offset impact of over-valuation of exchange rate with export subsidies 
and/or import taxes.
2. Reduce export taxes.
3. Introduce appropriate land taxes (e.g. betterment levy); consumption tax 
and/or income tax to be increased.
4. Reduce farm input and service subsidies.
5. Eliminate consumer food subsidies.
6. Reduce the number of agricultural white elephants.
7. Government should use savings from above to improve national agricultural 
services (agricultural research, extension, animal health, forestry and 
environmental services).
8. Managed float of exchange rate.
9. Privatisation of agricultural marketing and processing.
10. Parastatal divestiture and restructuring.
11. Financial market development.
12. Cadastres, land titling, land reform, land documentation.
13. Soil conversion programmes through research, extension, public works.
14. Environmental protection (protected areas, alternative energy supply, 
forest replanting, reclamation of degrated land, control of dangerous 
chemicals).
(Adapted from K. Cleaver)
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Additional Note 2:
ADVANCED MATERIALS AND AFRICAN COMMODITY POLICY
It is becoming urgent to integrate commodity policy with the radically 
changing scientific and technological circumstances of the 1990s. Attention 
needs to focus on the arrival of new inter-connected clusters of advanced 
materials which can be broadly classified as engineering plastics, advanced 
ceramics, composite and laminate systems, advanced metallic alloys and the new 
generation of high temperature superconducting materials. Primary exporters 
in Africa must recognise that the advent of advanced materials, the diffusion 
of microelectronics-based automation technologies and parallel organisational 
changes imply that the parameters for formulating commodity, trade and 
industrialisation strategies are altering fast.
Major dicontinuities and rapid changes lie ahead which will necessitate going 
beyond a simple examination of the demand trends for a particular commodity.
At the heart of the revolution in materials science lies the recent ability of 
scientists to intervene at the molecular and atomic level and rearrange the 
microstructure of materials in order to attain the required properties of the 
designed material. We can now start with the desirable properties and 
performance characteristics in use and design and process the material as 
required.
Such scientific and engineering design advances imply a vastly accelerated 
rate in materials and product invention and innovation, rapid obsolescence of 
existing products and processes, and reduced life-cycle for new materials, 
necessitating a simultaneous global marketing push, in contrast to the 
product-cycle approach, in order to amortise high R & D costs.
Materials research and development now requires that material scientists 
become closely involved in the processing and fabrication stages of 
production. In fact, as materials science and engineering merge, the design 
and processing of a material will be integrated with the design and 
manufacturing process of the end user.
Currently advance materials systems are mainly employed in high-technology 
sectors such as aerospace and defence, where performance overrides cost 
considerations. But given the vast research effort underway such materials 
are expected to make serious inroads into the markets for traditional natural 
commodities towards the end of the 1990s.
The diffusion of information technologies and of advanced materials 
technologies are likely to erode traditional sources of African natural 
comparative advantage in primary production and in some labour intensive 
activities. The domestic ability to absorb and apply the new technologies and 
incorporate materials with enhanced performance characteristics will influence 
the direction of industrial restructuring and consequently the region's place 
in the global division of labour and trade patterns.
Although the adverse impact of substitution and technical change is not a new 
phenomenon for industrial raw materials, the observed marked declines in 
intensity of use since the early 1970s signal the onset of irreversible 
structural forces acting on the demand side. Sectoral shifts in the product
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composition of national output away from materials intensive sectors, and 
declining material use per unit of final output have combined to reduce
intensity of use. This process is expected to accelerate in the 1990s as a
wide range of natural fibres, sugar and metals such as aluminium, steel, and 
copper face far greater substitution from the advanced materials spawned by 
the materials revolution. It is expected that by 2000 the US market for 
polymers, including synthetic rubbers will be 26 per cent of the total
materials markets as compared to 15 per cent in 1970. In contrast, the US
metal market is expected to decline to 38 per cent of the total as compared to 
50 per cent in 1970. Similar trends are expected in Europe and Japan.
It is therefore becoming necessary for primary producers in Africa to address 
the following questions:
What will be the competitive position of African producers of commodity 
metals given the need to employ advanced manufacturing techniques even at 
these early stages of production? Will there be increasingly stringent 
performance characteristics placed on materials throughout industry? Will 
designers in African countries need to choose advanced manufacturing 
technologies and to select higher performance materials, if only to compete in 
world markets? What will be the global marketing strategies of TNCs in the 
use of advanced materials and will Africa be included? Will the use of 
microelectronics-based manufacturing technologies in developing countries with 
its associated transfer of technology, increase the pressure for more 
generalised domestic use of new materials? Under what conditions ought 
African producers to remain in (or enter into) the processing of traditional 
raw materials and monolithic metals? What is the need and potential for 
gradually moving into higher value-added processing and fabrication? Should 
African economies be planning now to integrate their commodity sectors within 
an overall strategy to build up scientific and technological capacity to use, 
and in the long run to produce, specific advanced materials consistent with 
their natural endowments? Are there cumulative gains from early production 
and use of new materials, and will entry to these activities effectively 
be barred later on?
And one final question:
Should serious thought be given to the early creation of a Materials Research 
Centre for Africa? Apart from conducting pure scientific research and keeping 
in touch with developments in science and technology, the Centre could 
research into the defence of existing primary commodities of interest to 
Africa, in the production and use of new materials consistent with the needs 
and endowments of the region, and could assist the formulation of appropriate 
materials and industrialisation strategies for specific economies.
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COMMODITY PRODUCTION AND TRADE: 
The Impact of Domestic Policies
OVERVIEW
1. Commodity production levels are determined primarily by prices:
a. by price received versus cost of production
b. by commodity price relative to the price of alternative commodities 
or products the commodity producer could actually produce and sell.
2. In the case of some commodities (notably petroleum and natural gas) the 
financial costs of undertaking production may preclude it this option for 
some governments - especially for those of economically small, low 
income, heavily indebted countries. In Commodity marketing is influenced 
more by institutional factors or acquired comparative advantage. The 
barriers to entry relate to knowledge, personnel and contacts with access 
to working capital an important, but secondary, constraint.
3. Domestic policy can effect price/cost ratios and the price of a commodity 
(or commodities) relative to other prices at home. It can also have some 
impact on institutional factors affecting marketing, albeit more by 
worsening the position of external marketers than by improving (other 
than through subsidies) that of domestic ones.
4. Evaluation of the impact of domestic policies' on commodity production 
and marketing has often suffered from lack of clarity in two respects:
a. specifying the appropriate goals (which will not be maximisation of 
quantity exported or even of gross export earnings);
b. posing an artificial dichotomy between outward (export promoting) and 
inward (import substitution promoting) policies, when in practice the 
best policy is likely to involve selective export promotion and 
selective import substitution simultaneously.
5. Over the past forty years commodity prices have on a trend basis 
performed poorly relative to those of most manufactured goods in that:
a. globally commodity markets have grown less rapidly than either global 
trade or global GDP;
b. unit prices of commodities have risen less than those of 
manufactures.
6. There have been exceptions to these trends in some years and for some 
commodities over fairly extended periods. However, among major 
commodities only diamonds - the one commodity for which throughout the
period there has been an institutional structure which effectively 
co-ordinated product output - seems to have moved consistently against 
those trends. This must mean that globally - and for relatively large 
economies - the room for shifting commodity production on the commodity 
mix in order to offset slow growth in commodity export earnings (valued 
in terms of imports) is quite narrow.
Among major commodities, grains and sugar have performed particularly 
badly - notably over the past decade and a half. Whatever the merits of 
reducing dependence on imports of staple foods, this implies that the use
of domestic policy to promote exports of these crops does not promise
much. That conclusion might not hold for a very low cost grain or sugar 
producer which had previously been an importer or negligible exporter, 
and might not hold if export subsidies (notably by EEC and the USA) were 
phased out, but for most countries today it is a valid generalisation.
The general quantity growth, and price trends for commodities raise 
questions as to why domestic policies should be used to improve their 
domestic prices relative either to import substitutes or other exports. 
To do so is to run the danger of distorting the message of global price
signals. As the core of an export development strategy, the use of
domestic policies to manage - indeed, to reverse - trend global market 
price signals may be to plan to specialise in losers.
There can, however, be specific cases in which such intervention is 
desirable:
a. when there is a strong domestic price bias against the commodity in 
question by comparison with international price ratios;
b. when an important established export is being produced at a cost near 
or above the export price as a result of which output and export fall 
leading to foreign exchange losses which cannot be made good by 
efficient export promotion or efficient import substitution in the 
short term;
c. if a particular commodity does face relatively favourable global 
market demand and price trends so that investment at higher levels 
than are likely to be forthcoming without intervention appears to be 
justified.
These cases are not trivial. But they relate to general price reform 
(not the reform of commodity export pricing only) in the first case; to 
the rehabilitation of deteriorated existing commodity production sectors 
in the second; and to specific export opportunities in the third. They 
do not create a case for a general shielding of export commodity 
production from global price relativities.
This argument is related to, but separate from, the "fallacy of 
composition" argument. That argument in its simple form states that if 
price elasticities are less than one over the relevant time period, gross
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proceeds of all producers together will be decreased if they collectively 
increase output. Several caveats apply:
a. for a single producer whose share in production is small, expansion 
will pay, at least in terms of increasing the gross proceeds;
b. gross proceeds are an inadequate measure of gains - net (of import 
content) export proceeds and domestic surplus levels would appear to 
be better measures and would normally yield more conservative 
conclusions as to the circumstances under which output expansion was 
desirable;
c. because of the risks of substitution (and especially of concentrating 
research on substitute development and the possibilities of
recycling) to plan for trend output growth less rapid than global 
income elasticity times global GDP growth is probably imprudent.
11. Even with these caveats, it is clear that sweeping advice to sustain or 
to increase market share in present major export commodities does not
make sense to any producer if all should act on it. For example, had 
Sub-Saharan Africa maintained its market share for its main exports in
the 1970s it would have earned less foreign exchange than it did if other
producers had raised production at the same rates they actually achieved.
Only if it is assumed that total output levels would have been identical 
(other producers' lower output levels offsetting SSA's higher ones, tonne 
for tonne) it is possible to make sense of the World Bank's calculations 
that SSA's external debt (with the same import levels) could have been 
only half as high as it is had export market share been held.
Domestic Instruments For Influencing Production
12. One major domestic instrument which affects commodity production and its 
growth (or decline) is total de jure and de facto taxation of such 
production, both absolutely and relative to that of incomes derived from 
other sources. As a first principle it can be argued that, unless a 
special case can be made out, taxation should be approximately neutral as 
to source of income. Three caveats arise:
a. if certain commodities face falling real global price trends a 
modestly higher rate of taxation could be justified to reinforce 
market signals to alter the mix of production;
b. if commodity incomes are more unstable than incomes derived from 
other sources (and trend levels are predictable) then 
counter-cyclical taxation levels could be appropriate to avoid 
over-reaction to short term fluctuations. (But this implies that 
surpluses accumulated when prices are high will indeed be available 
for re-distribution to producers when prices are low.);
c. if the price of a commodity significant to an economy's overall 
exports is so low that export earnings (and therefore the country's 
import capacity is threatened, then lower than average taxation (or 
even negative taxation, i.e. subsidies) may be justified for a
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transitional period to hold up export levels while more efficient 
exports (and/or import substitutes) are built up.
13. In practice many African governments have taxed income from commodity 
exports more heavily than income from other sources whether by export 
taxes or by running up statutory marketing surpluses. There was - 
especially in SSA - a tendency for the disparity to become larger in the 
1970s and early 1980s. Without doubt in several cases such taxation 
played a major role in bringing about stagnation or decline in output and 
exports, as well as encouraging smuggling.
14. A second policy instrument is devaluation. To the extent it is effective 
in real (not just nominal) terms, devaluation increases the relative 
price of those products which are tradeable relative to those which are 
not. In principle therefore it is less selective than commodity specific 
tax reductions (or subsidy increases) and should be neutral between 
commodities and other exports and among commodities. However, that 
neutrality assumes equal import-content. Because the import content in 
their production is generally low, agriculture commodities are likely to 
be favoured vis a vis other exports, and some commodities (e.g. tree
crops) and some sub-modes of production (e.g. peasant) will be helped
more than others.
15. Severely overvalued exchange rates (unless fully offset by export
incentives, which is rare) clearly deter the growth or exports or even 
the maintenance of existing export levels. This results both from shifts 
in revenue/cost ratios and in prices relative to de facto non-tradeables 
(e.g. staple food in SSA in the 1970s and early 1980s). If a government 
does decide to deter the growth of exports generally, there are
unquestionably better ways to achieve that than by overvaluation of the 
domestic currency; and if it wants to deter (or encourage) specific
(commodity or other) exports, the use of targetted taxation or subsidies
is again much more efficient,
16. An undervalued exchange rate as an instrument to promote export is
probably also inappropriate. Developing country real exchange rates 
generally have declined since 1970, although for SSA this decline did not 
start until the early 1980s. For commodity producers it has been argued 
that this was a prudent response to adverse terms of trade shifts. 
However, given low commodity price elasticities the argument - globally 
and for major exporters - is circular. If steady real exchange rate 
depreciation does increase the rate of growth of commodity exports, it 
will also reinforce the terms of trade decline it was intended to offset.
17. Deliberate reduction of domestic marketing cost is also a policy
instrument. In some African countries marketing costs absorbed the
largest share of export proceeds, taxation took the next largest share 
and growers received the smallest share. Not surprisingly such patterns 
led to rapid declines in output, and to smuggling. Marketing surpluses
(public or private) amounting to more than a normal return on capital 
employed are treated in this paper as a form of de facto taxation.
Attention is therefore directed to polices affecting actual marketing
costs.
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18. In most of SSA, marketing costs (especially, but not exclusively in 
single channel public sector systems) are clearly too high. The reasons 
vary - too many employees, too high transport costs (relative to 
efficient fleet operators or hirers), too high physical losses, too long 
delay in sales and collection of proceeds (increasing finance and storage 
costs), poor management corruption. Which cost elements are too high and 
how they can be reduced (including by institutional changes) are 
questions of fact varying widely from case to case. The desirability of 
acting to reduce inefficient resource use however is clearcut. The case 
for passing on the full gains to growers (especially if the marketing 
operation was previously subsidised) is less universal. If prevailing 
revenue/cost and relative domestic price ratios are high enough to result 
in an adequate growth of output of a commodity facing inelastic demand, 
then subsidy reductions and/or allocations to build up alternative 
exports may have a higher opportunity value.
19. Policies that promote a steady decrease in production costs (other than 
by subsidy) are desirable however, whether or not world relative prices 
are deteriorating. Research and development expenditures on many (not 
all) tropical agricultural commodities are consistently too low, and the 
example of the international crop research institutes in spreading 
overhead costs and in improving the access of smaller producers to 
cost-reducing knowledge could be followed more widely.
The same holds for demand-increasing research and development, which 
either alters commodity characteristics to fit existing product needs (as 
has been done for natural rubber) or creates new uses (the most famous 
example being instant coffee).
International Marketing and Pre-Export Processing
20. Additional net export revenues from international marketing and
pre-exporting processing are superior in quality usually to those that 
may be gained from increased production. Because they do not increase 
the volume of the commodity produced, they therefore do not have a
negative effect on global prices. That said, significant barriers exist 
to the cost-efficient achievement of these methods of augmenting export 
revenues - especially in respect of international marketing.
21. Auctioning before export and direct use of international commodity
exchanges as well as direct sales to major users are international
marketing activities within the competence of the public sectors of most
African countries. They are also within the competence of the private
sectors of a number. Where these activities are not already practised or 
where they clearly result in selling at lower than average world prices 
(quality held constant), action is appropriate.
22. Deeper entry into commodity trading requires global information networks, 
experienced personnel and a large number of established business contacts 
as well as substantial working capital. Larger, middle income commodity 
exporters (e.g. several in Latin America and South and Southeast Asia) 
have the capacity to enter or expand in this field. The promotion of 
public enterprises or support to underwrite the start-up and learning
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costs for private sector enterprises would encourage such deepening of 
trade participation.
23. Enhanced South-South commodity trade is practicable if some means of
ensuring balanced bilateral or small group trade expansion (or expansion 
with agreed limits to imbalances) can be designed, negotiated and 
operated. More attention deserves to be paid to potential in this 
direction. Given the need for domestic state involvement and the lack of 
well-developed TNC channels, domestic (private or public) enterprises 
should be able to capture most of the ensuing marketing business.
24. Pre-export processing adds to export value without depressing commodity
prices. For some - not all - primary products it does offer efficient 
ways to expand domestic value added and export earnings. Examples 
include timber, sugar, cocoa, oil seed, iron ore, sisal, hides and 
perhaps coffee and tea. What products are promising and how far it 
should go (e.g. cocoa butter, powder, paste, liquor and mass - the 
intermediates - are likely to be more suitable than finished chocolate 
products) are empirical questions the answers to which vary by commodity, 
by country and over time.
25. What domestic policy instruments are needed, e.g, research and design
funding, direct capital injection, capital mobilisation, initial period 
taxes below average - will vary. However, in general far too little 
attention is devoted to potential in this area at the applied level, 
especially in SSA.
26. Domestic policy does need to include seeking to reduce international (= 
foreign domestic) barriers, notably:
a. cascade tariffs (could GATT be used for this?);
b. arrangements such as EEC's Lome Sugar Protocol which specifies a less 
processed rather than an economically more efficient, more processed 
form (i.e. raw vs refined in this case). (Could this be attended to 
in the Lome IV negotiations?);
These may be more achievable targets now than a decade ago. Many TNCs 
are willing to contract out their initial processing operations and to 
use intermediates, and many - not all - OECD processing sectors are not 
particularly economically significant nor self-evidently politically 
potent.
Liberalisation and Commodity Production and Prices
27. Economic stringency - especially undesired import compression and high 
net external payments for capital - creates pressure to maximise short
term export earnings. For and economy more than, say, 25$ of whose
exports are comprised of primary products, this is likely to mean
pressure to raise the volume of commodity exports.
28. There are, however, countervailing forces. Export taxation may be a
crucial revenue source, the capacity to subsidise exports may be limited,
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massive devaluation may be unable to alter domestic price relativities 
substantially, and investment capital to expand productive capacity may 
be scarce, either generally or to commodity producers in particular. 
Falling real global commodity prices, other things being equal, tend to 
reduce (or reverse) the rate of growth of production, as almost any 
elementary economic text tells us). Therefore, overall, the past decade 
has not been one of particularly high commodity output or export growth - 
au contraire.
29. 'Liberalisation' - especially when it is not in the context of an 
international package providing substantial debt service relief and new 
capital inflows - reinforces the tendencies of economic stringency to
lead to efforts to boost short run exports. Further, by including 
devaluation in excess of what relative overall domestic price movements 
would justify it may offset (distort) the global market price signals 
deterring increase in output growth.
30. The evidence on this last point is mixed. Outside SSA, liberalisation
seems to have led to export drives focussed on manufactures or pre-export
processing more than on expanding commodity exports. In SSA, dramatic 
export growth has been limited to a few countries and has to a large 
extent represented rehabilitation of existing capacity and/or the clawing 
back of previously smuggled exports. The extent to which raising real 
producer prices has played a role is unequal - very high in some cases
and problematic in others. The role of increased resource transfers
(leading to increased import capacity utilised in part to meet the import 
requirements of commodity production and of the infrastructure serving 
it) is generally significant; significantly positive that is where such 
transfers did increase and significantly negative where they decreased.
31 • In SSA, liberalisation has tended to be built on the presumption that
commodity exports were the key to restoring external balance and that
commodities were likely to enjoy moderately rapidly growing markets and 
constant or improving terms of trade. All three assumptions can now be 
seen to be wrong for most commodities and most countries. Thus time has 
been lost and attention directed away from articulating country-specific, 
practicable and efficient export development and import substitution
strategies and from the task of implementing such strategies.
Summary
32. Domestic policies - especially taxation, management of the exchange rate 
and promotion of cost reductions in production and domestic marketing - 
can effect commodity production significantly. Given current
elasticities of demand and present global price projections what the 
optimal extent and pattern of incentives to increase the production of 
commodities ought to be is itself unclear - but certainly is must vary by 
commodity and by country. However, policies which erode existing 
commodity export bases while putting nothing in their place are clearly 
unsound.
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33* Greater pre-export processing, South-South trade and participation in 
international marketing can be furthered by domestic policy. For some 
products and countries they hold out prospects of significant increases 
in net export earnings without the depressive price effects of export 
expansion to OECD and CMEA markets.
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COMMODITY PRODUCTION AND TRADE:
The Impact of Domestic Policies
OVERVIEW
1. Commodity production levels are determined primarily by prices:
a. by price versus cost of production
b. by commodity price relative to the price of alternative commodities 
or products the commodity producer could actually produce and sell.
2. Commodity marketing is influenced more by institutional factors or
acquired comparative advantage. In the case of some, but not all,
commodities (notably petroleum and natural gas) the financial 
requirements of entering into production may preclude it - especially for 
an economically small, low income, heavily indebted country. In 
commodity marketing the barriers relate to knowledge, personnel and
contacts with access to working capital an important, but secondary, 
constraint.
3. Domestic policy can effect price/cost ratios and the price of a commodity 
(or commodities) relative to other prices at home. It can also have some 
impact on institutional factors affecting marketing, albeit more by 
worsening the position of external marketers than by improving (other
than through subsidies) that of domestic ones.
4. Evaluation of domestic policies' impact on commodity production and
marketing has often suffered from lack of clarity in two respects:
a. specifying the appropriate goals (which can hardly be maximisation of 
quantity exported or even of gross export earnings);
b. posing an artificial dichotomy between outward (export promoting) and 
inward (import substitution promoting) policies when in practice 
certain relatively successful - at least in trade balance terms - 
economies such as Brazil and the Republic of Korea practice both
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selective export promotion and selective import substitution 
supporting policies.
5. Over the past forty-odd years commodity prices have on a trend basis 
performed poorly relative to those of most (not all) manufactured goods 
in the senses that:
a. globally commodity markets have grown less rapidly than either global 
trade or global GDP;
b. unit prices of commodities have risen less than those of 
manufactures.
6. There have been exceptions to these trends in some years and for some 
commodities over fairly extended periods. However, among major 
commodities only diamonds - the one commodity with an effective producer 
price and output coordination institutional structure throughout the 
period - seems to have been an exception to both for the period as a 
whole. This means that globally - and for relatively large economies - 
the room for shifting commodity production commodity mixes to offset 
stagnation or slow growth in commodity export earnings valued in terms of 
imports is quite narrow.
7. Among major commodities grains and sugar have performed particularly
badly - notably over the past decade and a half. This implies that, 
whatever the rather different merits of reducing dependence on imports of 
staple foods, they are not a particularly promising area for using 
domestic policy to promote exports. That conclusion might not hold for a 
very low cost grain or sugar producer which had previously been an 
importer or negligible exporter and might not hold if export subsidies
(notably by EEC and the USA) were phased out, but for most countries
today it is a valid generalisation.
8. The general quantity growth and price trends for commodities raise
questions as to why domestic policies should be used to improve their 
domestic prices relative either to import substitutes or other exports. 
To do so is to distort or manage global market price signals which can on 
occasion be defended even on a long term basis but does need specific
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justification. If seen as the core of an export development strategy 
such a use to domestic policies to manage - indeed to reverse - trend 
global market price signals is apparently to plan to specialise in 
losers.
9. There may be specific cases in which such intervention is desirable:
a. when there is a strong domestic price bias against the commodity in 
question compared to international ratios;
b. when an important export is being produced near or below cost leading 
to output and export (or at any rate non-smuggled output and export) 
falls which cannot be made good by efficient export promotion or 
efficient import substitution;
c. if the commodity in question does face relatively favourable global 
market quantity demanded growth and price trends to justify 
investment at higher levels than are likely to be forthcoming without 
intervention.
These cases are not trivial. But they appear to relate to general (not 
commodity export only) price reform in the first case; to rehabilitation 
of deteriorated existing commodity production sectors in the second and 
to specific opportunities in the third. They do not appear to create a 
case for general shielding of export commodity production from global 
price relativities.
10. This argument is related to, but separate from, the "fallacy of 
composition" one. That argument in its simple form shows that if price 
elasticities are less than one over the relevant period gross proceeds of 
all producers will be decreased if they increase output. Several caveats 
apply:
a. for a single producer whose share in production is less than the 
elasticity, at least at gross proceeds level expansion will pay;
b. gross proceeds are an inadequate measure of gains - net (of import 
content) export proceeds and domestic surplus levels would appear
better and would normally yield more conservative conclusions as to 
the circumstances under which output expansion was desirable;
c. because of the risks of substitution (and especially of concentrating 
research on substitute or recycling development) trend output growth 
less rapid than global income elasticity times global GDP growth is 
probably usually imprudent.
11. Even with these caveats it is clear that sweeping advice to sustain or to
increase market share in present major export commodities does not make
sense to any producer if all act on it. For example, had Sub-Saharan 
Africa maintained its market share for its main exports in the 1970s it 
would have earned less if other producers had raised production at the 
same rates they actually achieved. Only if it is assumed that total 
output levels would have been identical (other producers' lower output 
levels offsetting SSA's higher ones tonne for tonne) do the World Bank's 
calculations that SSA's external debt could (with constant import levels) 
have been half as high had export market share been held make sense.
Domestic Instruments For Influencing Production
12. One major domestic instrument which affects commodity production and
especially its growth (or decline) is total de jure and de facto taxation
of commodity production absolutely and relative to that of incomes
derived from other sources. As a first principle it can be argued that, 
unless a special case can be made out, taxation should be approximately 
neutral as to source of income. Three caveats arise:
a. if commodities face falling real global price trends a modestly
higher rate of taxation would be justified to reinforce market 
signals to alter the mix of production;
b. if commodity incomes are more unstable than incomes derived from
other sources (and trend levels are predictable) then 
counter-cyclical taxation levels would be appropriate to avoid 
over-reaction to short term fluctuations;
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c. if the price of a commodity significant to an economy's overall 
exports is so low that absolute price/cost ratios and/or relative 
(domestic) prices so unfavourable as to threaten radical export 
(import capacity) falls, then lower than average taxation (including 
negative taxation, i.e. subsidies) is justified for a transitional 
period to hold up export levels while more efficient exports (and/or 
import substitutes) are built up.
13. In practice many commodity exporters have taxed income from commodity 
exports more heavily than from other sources whether by export taxes 
or/and by statutory marketing surpluses. There was - especially in SSA - 
a tendency for the disparity to become larger in the 1970s and early 
1980s. Without doubt in several cases such taxation did play a major 
role in output/export stagnation, decline or smuggling.
14. A second instrument is devaluation. To the extent it is effective in 
real, not just nominal, terms devaluation increases the relative price of 
those products which are in practice tradeable relative to those which 
are not. In principle therefore it is less selective than commodity 
specific tax reductions (subsidy increases) and should be neutral between 
commodities and other exports and among commodities. However, that 
neutrality assumes equal import content so that commodities are likely to 
be favoured vis a vis other exports and some commodities (e.g. tree 
crops) or sub-modes of production (e.g. peasant) more helped than others.
15. Clearly severely overvalued exchange rates (unless fully offset by export 
incentives, which is rare) deter the growth or even maintenance of 
existing export levels. This results both from shifts in revenue/cost 
ratios and in prices relative to de facto non-tradeables (e.g. staple 
food in SSA in the 1970s and early 1980s). If a country wishes to deter 
growth of exports in general there are better ways to do it than 
overvaluation and if it wishes to deter (or encourage) specific 
(commodity or other) exports taxation/subsidy policy is a much more 
targetted and efficient instrument.
16. Undervaluation as an export promoting policy is less than clearly 
appropriate. On the whole developing country real exchange rates have 
declined since 1970 (since the early 1980s for SSA which previously was
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an exception). At least for commodity producers it has been argued that 
this is a prudent response to adverse terms of trade shifts. However, 
given low commodity price elasticities the argument - globally and for 
major exporters - is circular. If steady real exchange rate depreciation 
does increase the rate of growth of commodity exports, it will reinforce 
the terms of trade decline it was intended to offset.
17. Domestic marketing cost reduction is a policy instrument. In extreme 
cases in SSA marketing costs took the largest share of export proceeds, 
taxation the next and grower prices the lowest. Not surprisingly such 
patterns when long continued led to rapid output erosion (or smuggling). 
For purposes of this paper marketing surpluses (public or private) beyond 
a normal return on capital employed are treated as a form of de facto 
taxation. Attention is therefore to actual marketing costs.
18. Especially in SSA marketing costs (especially, but not only and not 
always, in single channel public sector systems) are clearly too high. 
The reasons vary - too many employees, too high transport costs (relative 
to efficient fleet operators or hirers), too high physical losses, too 
long delay in sales and collection of proceeds (increasing finance and 
storage costs), corruption. Which cost elements are too high and how 
they can be reduced (including by institutional changes) are questions of 
fact varying widely from case to case. The desirability of acting to 
reduce inefficient resource use is clearcut. That for passing on the 
full gains to growers (especially if the marketing operation was 
previously subsidised) is less universal. If revenue/cost and relative 
domestic price ratios are high enough to result in an adequate (however 
defined) growth of output of a commodity facing inelastic demand then 
subsidy reductions and/or allocation to building up alternative exports 
may have a higher opportunity value.
19. Production cost decreases (other than by subsidy) are desirable however 
the gains are best allocated and whether world relative prices are 
deteriorating creating a price/cost squeeze or not. Certainly research 
and development expenditure on many (not all) tropical agricultural 
commodities is too low and more (if possibly using analogues to the 
international crop research institutes to spread overhead costs and to 
improve access of smaller producers to cost reducing knowledge) is
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desirable. The same holds for demand increasing research and development 
either altering commodity characteristics to fit existing product needs 
(as has been done in the case of natural rubber) or creating new uses 
(the most famous being instant coffee).
International Marketing and Pre-Export Processing
20. Additional net export revenues from international marketing and 
pre-exporting processing are superior in quality in most cases to those 
from increased production. They do not increase the volume of the 
commodity produced and therefore do not have a negative effect on global 
prices. That said, significant barriers to cost efficient achievement of 
these export revenue increases exist - especially for international 
marketing.
21. Auctioning before export and direct use of international commodity 
exchanges as well as direct sales to major users are international 
marketing activities within the competence of the public sectors of most 
and the private sectors of a number. Where they are not already 
practised or clearly result in selling at lower than average world prices 
(quality held constant) action is appropriate.
22. Deeper entry into commodity trading requires global information networks,
experienced personnel and a large number of established business contacts 
as well as substantial working capital. Larger, middle income commodity 
exporters (e.g. several in Latin America and South and Southeast Asia)
have the capacity to enter or expand in this field. Whether by public
commercial enterprises or start-up/learning cost support to private such 
economies should encourage such deepening of trade participation.
23* Enhanced South-South commodity trade is practicable if some means to
ensuring bilateral or small group balanced (or with agreed imbalance 
limits) trade expansion can be designed, negotiated and operated. More
attention should be paid to potential in this direction. Given the need
for domestic state involvement and the lack of well-developed TNC 
channels, domestic (private or public) enterprises should be able to 
capture most of the marketing business.
24. Pre-export processing adds to export value without depressing commodity 
prices. For some - not all - primary products it does offer efficient 
ways to expand domestic value added and export earnings. Examples 
include timber, sugar, cacoa, oil seed, iron ore, sisal, hides and 
perhaps coffee and tea. What products are promising and how far it 
should go (e.g. cocoa butter, powder, paste, liquor and mass - the 
intermediates - are likely to be more suitable than finished chocolate 
products) are empirical questions the answers to which vary by commodity, 
by country and over time.
25. What domestic policy instruments are needed, e.g, research and design 
funding, direct capital injection, capital mobilisation, initial period 
taxes below average - will vary. However, in general far too little 
attention is devoted to potential in this area at the applied level, 
especially in SSA.
26. Domestic policy does need to include seeking to reduce international 
(foreign domestic) barriers, notably:
a. cascade tariffs (via GATT?);
b. arrangements such as EEC's Lome Sugar Protocol which specify a less
processed rather than an economically more efficient more processed
form (i.e. raw vs refined in this case - via Lome IV negotiations).
These may be more achievable targets now than a decade ago. Many TNCs
are willing or eager to contract their initial processing operations and 
to use intermediates and many - not all - OECD processing sectors are not 
particularly economically significant nor self-evidently politically 
potent.
Liberalisation and Commodity Production and Prices
27. Economic stringency - especially undesired import compression and high 
net external payments for capital (e.g. interest) capital payments (on 
current and capital account together) - creates pressure to maximise 
short term export earnings. In the case of an economy whose exports are
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over - say - 25? from primary products, this is likely to mean pressure 
to raise the volume of commodity exports.
28. There are, however, countervailing forces. Export taxation may be a 
crucial revenue source, subsidies for exports may be limited and massive 
devaluation unable to alter domestic price relativities substantially 
(either because there are obstacles to implementing the devaluation or 
because subsequent price movements cancel it), investment capital to 
expand productive capacity may be scarce either generally or to commodity 
producers in particular. Even more basic, falling real global commodity 
prices, other things being equal, tend to reduce (or reverse) the rate of 
growth of production (as almost any elementary economic text, whatever 
its school of thought, tells us). Therefore, overall the past decade has 
not been one of particularly high commodity output or export growth - au 
contraire.
29. Liberalisation - especially when it is not in the context of an 
international package providing substantial debt service relief and new 
capital inflows - reinforces the tendencies of economic stringency to 
lead to efforts to boost short run exports. Further, by including 
devaluation in excess of what relative overall domestic price movements 
would justify it may offset (distort) the global market price signals 
deterring increase in output growth.
30. The evidence on this score is mixed. Outside SSA, liberalisation seems 
to have led to export drives focussed on manufactures or pre-export 
processing more than on expanding commodity exports. In SSA the dramatic 
export growth has been limited to a few countries and has to a large 
extent represented rehabilitation of existing capacity and/or clawing 
back smuggled exports. The extent to which raising real producer prices 
has played a role is unequal - very high in some cases and problematic in 
others. The role of increased resource transfers leading to increased 
import capacity utilised in part to meet the import requirements of 
commodity production and of the infrastructure serving it is generally 
significant; significantly positive that is where such transfers did 
increase and significantly negative where they fell.
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31. In SSA liberalisation has tended to be built on the presumption that 
commodity exports were the key to restoring external balance and that 
commodities were likely to enjoy moderately rapidly growing markets and 
constant or improving terms of trade. All three assumptions can now be 
seen to be wrong for most commodities and countries. Thus valuable time 
has been lost and attention directed away from articulating country 
specific practicable efficient export development and import substitution 
strategies and beginning to implement them.
Summary
32. Domestic policies - especially taxation, exchange rate and promotion of 
production and domestic marketing cost reduction - can effect commodity 
production significantly. What the optimal degree of incentives to 
increased production is given elasticities of demand and present global 
price projections are is unclear and varies by commodity and by country. 
However, policies which erode existing commodity export bases while 
putting nothing in their place are clearly unsound.
33* Greater pre-export processing, South-South trade and international
marketing participation in international marketing can be furthered by 
domestic policy. For some products and countries they hold out prospects 
of significant net export earnings increases without the depressive 
price effects of export expansion to OECD and CMEA markets.
- R. H. Green 
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